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Organized Labor’s Coalition Politics 
in Hamburg and Seattle
Ian Greer
Why do some unions engage in special interest politics while others pursue 
broader social goods? In this chapter I examine the effect of global markets for 
capital and local political mobilization. I argue that protecting jobs requires 
unions to engage in coalition politics, sometimes in pursuit of social goods that 
have benefits beyond the interests of union members. In cases, however, of high- 
stakes economic development projects involving large employers, the affected 
unions join business-driven coalitions with narrowly economistic pro-jobs agen­
das. I demonstrate this argument by comparing union involvement in the poli­
tics of economic development in Seattle and Hamburg. Because the argument 
holds in both Germany and the United States, labors constraints and opportu­
nities may increasingly have to do less with national differences than with the par­
ticulars of local politics and labor-business dependence.
LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
As capital has become more global, unions have found that they have to partici­
pate in local policies to attract and retain “good jobs.” This race for capital creates 
an unfortunate paradox. The globalization of capital and corporate organization 
leads to a localization or decentralization of collective labor participation. Al-
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though trade unionists are caught up in this daily grind to attract, retain, or or­
ganize jobs in a specific place, their employers and other adversaries are organized 
on a much broader scale.
“Decentralization” and “localization,” however, are vague concepts. Although 
studies of comparative politics and industrial relations tend to stress the in-plant 
character of participation (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Turner 1991), 
worker participation can also extend beyond the workplace into the broader com­
munity and local politics (Locke 1992). Sometimes unions act as social partners 
and sometimes as contentious worker representatives. Their goals can be self-in­
terested and economistic or broad and social.
Case studies can bring some clarity to the matter. In an international com­
parison of union political participation in two urban regions, Hamburg and Seat­
tle, I find striking parallels. In the construction and health-care sectors, trade 
unionists followed a strategy to retain jobs, attract members, and innovate in the 
provision of broader social goods. For these unions, participation creates oppor­
tunities with broader implications for the local labor and progressive scenes. Par­
ticipation, however, also has a dark side. In the aerospace sector, unions were 
caught up in a high-stakes race for capital investment from a major employer. 
Meeting corporate demands involved deep social costs beyond the camp of or­
ganized labor.
One way to understand patterns of coalition formation is to examine national 
patterns of labor-management relations. The nationally specific rules governing 
labor-management relations lead to some differences in how unions participate 
in the political economy. In the 1980s, researchers on the German labor move­
ment found that, by giving workers strong participation rights, strong institu­
tions of in-plant worker participation allowed unions to participate in industry 
restructuring from a position of strength (Turner 1991). “Varieties of capitalism” 
theory argued further that labor-management relations in Germany differ from 
those in the United States because of nationally specific features of capitalism that 
give some German employers a “comparative institutional advantage” (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Baccaro, Hamann, and Turner (2003) turned institutional expla­
nation on its head with an argument that U.S. unions are dynamic because of the 
relative absence of institutionalized “insider” channels of influence.
A second option is to examine urban development politics and ask how unions 
work with other locally organized interests to deal with policy issues that affect 
workers. Businesses and politicians, for example, can be close allies with labor, 
since they, too, favor economic development. In cities that are hemorrhaging 
manufacturing jobs, however, this usually involves painful compromises (Savitch 
and Kantor 2002), and in many younger cities “growth machines” consistently 
place business promotion above all other policy goals (Logan, Whaley, and Crow-
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der 1997). If this economism is one kind of urban policymaking, postmaterialism 
is also a possibility. Postmaterialistic policymakers take up issues of social ser­
vices, income equality, and environmental sustainability (Portnoy 2003), some­
times with the active support of unions (Rose 2000) and business interests (Sellers 
2002). This approach does not rule out the national context as important but 
places it among the many factors shaping the “menu” of options for urban-level 
policy (Savitch and Kantor 2002).
The mobilizations of other business and civil society actors and their relations 
of dependence on their employers shape the strategies of unions in Seattle and 
Hamburg. Despite different sets of worker rights and bargaining practices insti­
tutionalized at the national level, unions in both cities rely on coalitions as they 
respond to restructuring. High-stakes races for investment combined with one­
sided relations of dependence by workers on their employer require an econo- 
mistic approach to coalition politics. In other areas of local policy, however, such 
as workforce development policy and public sector restructuring, it is possible for 
unions to fight for jobs while pursuing other social goods.
In this chapter I make this case by examining union approaches to growth pol­
itics in two union strongholds, Hamburg and Seattle. Both cities have seen a re­
cent revival of labor-community coalitions, pushed in part by the unions’ central 
coordinating bodies— the local affiliates of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(DGB, German Confederation of Trade Unions) and the AFL-CIO— and facili­
tated by a civil society willing to cooperate. Although Hamburg has not seen any­
thing on the scale of the 1999 WTO protests, labor’s coalition work there has 
produced spillovers with broad local significance. Hamburg and Seattle have both 
experienced declines in waterfront and defense-oriented manufacturing indus­
tries, successful efforts by local elites to develop a new economy, a growth in ser­
vice employment, strong left-liberal political traditions, and intense competition 
in the market for capital investment. Local union officials in both cities assist in- 
plant worker representatives in negotiations with management, in strikes, and in 
local political issues such as privatization and economic development policy. De­
spite periodic conflicts of interest, a strong culture of solidarity in both cities pre­
vents local unions from pulling out of central bodies or engaging in intense 
rivalries. Although collective bargaining is formally more centralized in Germany 
than in the United States, this does not affect the variables that shape union coali­
tion-building strategies. Comparing cities with similar political cultures, levels of 
union strength, industry structure, and economic vitality allows a test of the rel­
ative importance of sectoral and national differences.
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HAMBURG
Hamburg, Germany’s second largest city, with 1.7 million residents, has a long 
history as an independent Hanseatic port city (freie Hansestadt) on the Elbe River. 
The Hansestadt is a city-state within the German federal system, governed by a 
directly elected city council that elects an executive cabinet (the Senate) and 
mayor. The city’s territory corresponds roughly to its economic space, thanks to 
a Nazi-era reform annexing the nearby industrial towns of Harburg, Wilhelms­
burg, and Altona. The region has been a union stronghold from the nineteenth 
century through World War I, through two failed Communist revolutions (in­
cluding Hamburg’s own Thaelmann Putsch of 1923), and the turbulent Weimar 
Republic. After a twelve-year period of illegality under Hitler, unions enjoyed a 
forty-four-year period of integration in a Social Democratic Party-led local gov­
erning coalition, ending with SPD defeat in 2001.
The 2001 defeat was a long time coming and reflected a deeper crisis in the so­
cial democratic milieu. Since 1970, white-collar employment had doubled and 
blue-collar employment had declined by half, blue collar unemployment had 
grown, and union membership had declined. At the same time, the national SPD 
government had pushed a painful program of welfare state retrenchment that 
hurt the most vulnerable working people. Poor neighborhoods shifted their votes 
toward right-wing populist parties and the conservative Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU).
Until 2001, unions were part of a local governing coalition that developed a 
strong postindustrial economy. Through military conversion campaigns, strug­
gles against plant closings and the race for investment capital, their involvement 
in economic development policy stretches back to the 1970s. Attracting invest­
ment became a focus of the SPD in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in media, the 
harbor, and aerospace (Läpple 2000). The local DGB and the public sector union, 
Öffentliche Dienst, Transport, und Verkehr (ÖTV), similarly worked to expand 
the harbor. The unions and the local government also negotiated over the ratio­
nalization and privatization of public services, which most local elites viewed as 
bringing Hamburg into the postindustrial era. In the late 1990s, the local of the 
metalworkers union, IG Metall, having declined from fifty-six thousand to forty 
thousand members since the early 1970s, became deeply involved in a push for a 
new Airbus plant. These initiatives, however, had social and environmental costs 
and strong local opposition, often within the union camp.
This pattern of local participation and coalition politics changed with the de­
feat of the SPD. Unions, dealing with the same trends, found that they needed a 
more vocal, public approach. Their most dramatic public display of discontent
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came when the Senate announced its intention to privatize the public hospitals, 
the Landesbetrieb Krankenhaeuser (LBK). The unions organized a ballot initia­
tive to fight privatization, which led to a series of spillover campaigns focused on 
local democracy (making ballot initiatives more binding) and the preservation of 
other public services. Contrasting union approaches at Airbus and LBK is in­
structive, because it shows how Hamburg’s unions shifted from an insider strat­
egy for jobs to a strategy of contesting the new government’s vision of how 
development should proceed.
Germany’s distinctive industrial relations institutions shape how worker rep­
resentation happens. Unions and works councils in Germany are products of the 
so-called dual system of industrial relations. Unions negotiate wages and lead 
strikes, usually at the regional-sectoral level. IG Metall is a conglomerate union 
representing workers in steel, automotive, aerospace, electronics, shipbuilding, 
and a wide range of other manufacturing industries. Ver.di (Vereinigte Dienst- 
leistungsgewerkschaft or United Services Union), similarly, represents workers at 
all levels of government and in most private service industries as well. Works 
councils, which may not call strikes, are elected by workers and represent the daily 
concerns of workers in the workplace and translate sectoral agreements into in- 
plant regulations.
In practice, these roles are usually blurred, and union members dominate the 
works councils of both Airbus and LBK (although Hamburg’s Airbus works 
council has a substantial antiunion caucus). IG Metall in Hamburg pursues a 
strategy of “workplace-near” collective bargaining, in which the regional sectoral 
agreements, covering Germany’s northern coastal regions, are customized in 
close consultation with the works council to deal with issues specific to the firm. 
One agreement at Airbus, for example, is called “Siduflex.” It buffers the com­
pany’s core German workforce, including thirteen thousand workers in Ham­
burg, from the industry’s vicissitudes through a series of agreements that cover 
working time accounts (schemes to pay for time off during business downturns 
in exchange for unpaid overtime during boom periods), temporary workers, and 
outsourcing. Siduflex, however, has been hampered by the low degree of union 
organization in the white-collar areas of the plant. While union density among 
blue-collar workers keeps overall union density above a quarter, membership 
among white-collar workers (who outnumber blue-collar workers 2-1 in the 
plant) has slid from 15 percent to below 10 percent.
Outside the firm, therefore, union participation has proven crucial. In De­
cember 1997, Airbus’s works council and IG Metall began to experience the dark 
side of economic development politics. Airbus managers announced a program 
to build a new giant airplane, the A380. Managers projected two thousand new
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jobs in the plant and twt> thousand jobs at local suppliers for the winner. A com­
petition between local governments ensued to determine where the firm would 
place the investments and jobs.
Hamburg’s local IG Metall leadership participated in a coalition, which in­
cluded local business associations, government agencies, politicians, and the 
DGB, to win public expenditures to fill in a waterway for plant construction and 
pass a series of laws to expedite construction. Farmers, environmental groups, af­
fluent neighbors (whose views would be spoiled by the construction site and the 
new production complex), and others (mainly artists and media professionals 
who considered the “jobs above all else” agenda an infringement on the Hanse­
stadt’s tradition of local democracy and autonomy) opposed the subsidies and 
land redevelopment plans. Stiff competition came from Toulouse, which had the 
same sorts of advantages as Hamburg. Other regions, such as Rostock and Dres­
den in eastern Germany, developed public policy arguments for national govern­
ment officials (who still exert some influence at the company) that they had the 
necessary infrastructure and skills but needed the jobs more than the wealthy 
Hansestadt. Furthermore, Hamburg’s progrowth coalition was under time pres­
sure, since the company needed to fill in part of a local waterway before it could 
build new production buildings and ramp up A380 production. In the end, the 
company decided to accept incentive packages from both Toulouse and Hamburg 
and built two final assembly lines for the A380, each one carrying out various 
stages of assembly.
The works council and IG Metall had the support of the local DGB, business 
organizations led by the Chamber of Commerce, and politicians across the spec­
trum, including the Greens and the SPD. This coalition not only won public 
money for infrastructure, it helped the company steer through the land use deci­
sions necessary to construct the plant, including the filling of the waterway and 
the seizure of private land through eminent domain. In February 2001 Ham­
burg’s supreme administrative court decided the final appeal on whether or not 
to halt construction due to its implications for the environment and property 
owners. On the day of the decision, IG Metall mobilized seven thousand workers 
downtown to show support for the project. The court ruled in favor of the 
government and Airbus.
Workers, in principle, had some tools to counter this whipsawing. The unions 
had political channels, in that Airbus, a creation of governmental industrial pol­
icy, remains a policy instrument of governments to shape economic develop­
ment. German workers, furthermore, have codetermination rules giving them 
extensive access to corporate decision making in areas of personnel and invest­
ment. The company could not credibly claim that it was in a time of hardship, 
since it had enjoyed recent successes in the global market for planes. Furthermore,
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Airbus workers have an organ for international solidarity. The European Works 
Council brings worker representatives from throughout Europe together for 
meetings and even includes a special economics committee modeled on German 
codetermination, far beyond the legal minimum stipulated by European Union 
legislation. Nevertheless, the interregional competition for jobs faced no orga­
nized resistance from European or nationwide worker representation bodies.
Why did unions not resist this whipsawing between workplaces and cities? 
Union officials faced a dilemma, since they did not want to sacrifice environ­
mental quality or public funds, but believed, along with local elites, in the im­
portance of the Airbus investment for the region’s economic future. Worker 
representatives had an extra incentive to protect jobs, since Airbus workers lacked 
mobility in the local labor market; there are not many employers of aerospace en­
gineers or machinists outside of Airbus. The largest one, Lufthansa’s maintenance 
operation, does not pay according to IG Metall’s metal industry contract, and the 
smaller firms depend on Airbus for orders. The costs included damage to histor­
ically and environmentally important places, a heavy burden of subsidies for tax­
payers, and criticism from within union ranks (Remarque 2001).
Although IG Metall continued working to help the company deal with the lo­
cal politics associated with expansion, it changed its approach somewhat. By late 
2004, the land-use issues were still in play, as the company fought nearby villagers 
to buy land for a new transport center. The union and the SPD, however, were not 
feeling the intense pressures of 1997-2001. With the A380 in production and the 
SPD out of the Senate, the unions and SPD called for a compromise to protect 
the local landscape.
The dilemmas facing unions in Hamburg shifted dramatically with the 2001 
local election. The new right-wing coalition government continued public sector 
rationalization and economic development projects but eliminated the unions’ 
previous channels of influence. Although Erhard Pumm, the head of the local 
DGB, retained his seat as an SPD city councilor, he lost his influence in the exec­
utive branch. The new coalition government of liberals, conservatives, and right- 
wing populists announced that it would privatize a majority stake in LBK. The 
hospital privatization fight led to a major test for the newly merged ver.di (which 
included the old ÖTV) and its leader, Wolfgang Rose. Pumm and Rose responded 
to hospital privatization by organizing mobilizations of hospital workers and 
community allies and by shifting the union’s role from labor-management-gov­
ernment partnership to community mobilization.
The Senate had created LBK in 1996 as part of an effort to make public agen­
cies independent and entrepreneurial. Because LBK accounted for about half of 
Hamburg’s local hospital beds and fifteen thousand employees, rationalizing it 
had huge implications for economic development and social well-being. That
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year, the works council and ÖTV negotiated a series of concessions in order to 
make LBK more efficient, including massive outsourcing of services (cleaning, 
cooking, transport, maintenance, and information technology), the closure of a 
hospital, and the elimination of three thousand jobs. In exchange, the union and 
works council won policies to cushion the impact of downsizing on the work­
force. This exchange was possible because of the close ties between unionists, 
managers, and top policymakers in the government, including an affiliation with 
the SPD shared by all three.
The post-2001 battle over privatization proceeded differently. In principle, 
Pumm, Rose, and the works council did not want to be “blockers”; they agreed 
with the government that updating the company’s physical infrastructure would 
require some private financing. Unions and the SPD proposed 49 percent priva­
tization, to retain local public control of health care, while obtaining the capital 
needed for upgrades. CDU health-care and public-financing experts, however, ar­
gued that private suppliers of capital would not accept a minority stake. Since 
hospital chains would be assuming the risks, they argued, the purchaser— in this 
case, for-profit hospital chain Asklepios— would require control and 74 percent 
ownership.
In response to the Senate’s new policy, Rose rallied LBK workers, his own 
organization, and a range of allies to organize one of the city-state’s first ballot 
initiatives with the slogan “Gesundheit ist keine Ware” (Health Is Not a Com­
modity). The coalition included other unions (especially the local DGB), po­
litical parties, globalization critics “attac,” the doctors’ association (Marburger 
Bund), individual patients, and ver.di’s national office. Antiprivatization cam­
paigners collected one hundred thousand signatures in the city’s public squares 
and shopping areas and organized numerous rallies and demonstrations. Atten­
dance at workplace meetings dramatically increased, and, over the opposition of 
management, the works council announced an unprecedented citywide meeting 
of LBK workers. Conservative politicians fought back with anticommunist lan­
guage, equating state-owned hospitals with the combines of preunification East 
Germany.1
In late 2003, the Senate signed the privatization agreement with Asklepios and 
was hoping to finalize the deal before the issue went to the voters. The transfer 
stalled, however, when one of the governing parties imploded. A judge ruled that 
local elections would take place at the same time as the LBK ballot initiative. The 
SPD— itself a privatizer before 2001— took opposition to LBK privatization into 
its early 2004 election program.
1. Anonymous, “LBK: Koalition schießt scharf,” Hamburger Abendblatt, May 8, 2003: http://www. 
abendblatt.de/daten/2003/05/08/ 159035.htm l?prx=l.
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The ballot initiative was, by all accounts, a powerful tool. Conservative party 
officials said in interviews that the unions had been so successful in “instrumen- 
talizing” popular feelings of insecurity that they had to focus on their mayoral 
candidate, the photogenic Ole von Beust, rather than controversial policy issues. 
For similar reasons, LBK administrators and Asklepios managers kept a low pro­
file. Although the initiative won over three-quarters approval from the voters, the 
conservatives won an absolute majority on the city council.
The fate of LBK’s workers thus remains far from resolved; the workplace con­
flict and related spillover campaigns remain active and visible. After the 2004 elec­
tion, the CDU ignored the vote over the ballot initiative and continued efforts to 
transfer LBK to Asklepios; eventually, in December 2004, it won a court decision 
allowing it to privatize LBK. As a result, the NGO Mehr Demokratie, e.V. (More 
Democracy) jumped into the fray, working with the unions and opposition po­
litical parties on a second project, “Rettet den Volksentscheid” (Save the Ballot 
Initiative), to make ballot initiatives legally binding in Hamburg. Rose has initi­
ated a national effort to encourage other Ver.di locals to use the ballot initiative 
process. The tactic was indeed effective in delaying privatization, improving com­
munity relations, mobilizing workers in the hospitals, winning more members, 
and learning how to mobilize public opinion around emotional issues. It remains 
unclear, however, whether this fight will help unions cope with issues inside the 
workplace, such as the terms of the handover. In upcoming effects bargaining, 
management will push to extend working hours. It is unclear what the coalitions 
mean for these negotiations or for the Senate’s upcoming program to revise pub­
lic sector labor law, privatize more services, and cut other social programs.
LBK and Airbus illustrate changes in the opportunity structure faced by Ham­
burg’s labor movement since the 1990s. At first, labor had allied itself with a so­
cial democratic government bent on a vigorous economic development program. 
Under conservative governments, however, rather than a process of joint prob­
lem solving, hospital rationalization sparked a battle over privatization and a se­
ries of mobilizations and coalitions that will probably continue for years to come. 
This struggle helped to build a nascent local ver.di organization and revive the lo­
cal DGB. The meaning of participation shifted from mobilizing as the govern­
ment’s junior partner to developing alternative strategies and building a new 
social coalition. After the 2001 election, unions had a broader menu of options 
because of their independence from the government and ver.di’s broad scope be­
yond LBK and the health-care industry.
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SEATTLE
Since the mid-1990s Seattle has gained a reputation as a hot spot of union revi­
talization.2 With relatively high union density, its booming service, transporta­
tion, and high-tech economy has made it the economic engine of the Pacific 
Northwest. Like Hamburg, Seattle is an economic development success story, 
where progrowth politics have succeeded, albeit unevenly and with social costs. 
Seattle’s trade unionists share many challenges with their colleagues in Hamburg. 
A large aircraft manufacturer’s strategy of pitting regions against each other 
forced organized labor into a business-led coalition, sacrificing social goods for 
economic development. Meanwhile, in other sectors, labor has managed to com­
bine its interest in job retention with other goals. Efforts by unions to retain union 
jobs in construction involve new policies to spread the gains from economic de­
velopment to disadvantaged groups and has facilitated the revitalization of Seat­
tle’s AFL-CIO affiliate, the King County Labor Council (KCLC). Like Hamburg, 
this renewal has taken place as union membership density has declined (although 
economic growth and organizing have increased the absolute union membership 
in the region).
The economic development politics of Seattle has both probusiness and pro­
gressive elements. The region is highly dependent on Boeing and focused on 
building up its physical infrastructure. Progressive forces, however, are also firmly 
entrenched, with powerful environmental and other community organizations. 
Compared to Hamburg’s SPD, Seattle’s Democrats, some of whom are among the 
state’s most progressive politicians, have a solid base of support. Organized labor 
has joined this constellation of forces, after a long period of conservatism. Seat­
tle Union Now, Jobs with Justice, the Worker Center AFL-CIO, the Boeing strikes, 
the massive WTO protests, and dozens of smaller, lesser-known campaigns and 
projects all attest to the ferment of Seattle labor during the 1990s. Since then, the 
KCLC (along with its state-level equivalent) has revived its member-mobilization 
program around election campaigns, introduced a new endorsement process, 
brought pressure to bear on labor-supported candidates, and built broad coali­
tions that include environmentalists, community groups, and portions of the re­
gion’s business community. Although unions have had success in fusing broader 
social goods to the politics of construction, winning the high-stakes race for aero­
space jobs has split the labor movement (though only in the short run) over the 
costs of development.
The training initiatives of the Seattle King County Building Trades Council are 
an important part of local labor movement revival in Seattle. After decades of
2. This section draws heavily on Byrd and Greer 2005.
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fighting the minority community over job access, the building trades began 
around 1990 to find ways to bring women and minorities into the trades. Ron 
Judd, who later became head of the KCLC, was one of the initial bridge builders 
who built an alliance with community groups, politicians, quasi-public agencies, 
private contractors, and developers to shape the way that large projects and train­
ing are governed (Rosenblum 2001). The new rules that the building-trades 
council and the Worker Center have constructed have secured the market share 
of unionized contractors, bolstered labor-governed training problems, and ad­
dressed some of the problems faced by minority and female apprentices and firms 
on job sites. Although community activists argue that some of the industry’s 
racist recruitment policies continue, the programs’ inadequacies have not pre­
vented deep coalition building.
Since the late 1960s, Seattle’s building-trades unions have faced two major 
challenges. First, like most cities, they have faced low-cost competition and non­
union contractors taking over predominately unionized markets such as com­
mercial and industrial building projects. Second, public works projects have been 
a flashpoint of racial tension. Federal urban renewal projects became a battle­
ground, as organized minority contractors and workers, led by Tyree Scott, shut 
down job sites. Building trades council and KCLC leaders mobilized thousands 
of white members in rallies to sway the Republican governor and county execu­
tive to resist the insurgents’ demands. Labor leaders railed against an “unholy al­
liance” of civil rights groups, Republicans, and contractors (Griffey 2004).
In the early 1990s, however, the building-trades council switched from this 
defensive approach to a more proactive coalition-based approach. Reforms in 
apprenticeship rules and improved community relations were central to this 
strategy. Judd worked with local community leaders to develop a set of rules gov­
erning building projects. The purpose was to protect the market share of union 
contractors and bring women and minorities into the trades. Adding social 
goals generated broad political support for project labor agreements (PLAs) and 
brought a stream of funding from the Port of Seattle.
The main policy initiative consisted of rules requiring minimum levels of ap­
prenticeship utilization and enforceable racial and gender diversity targets. Ini­
tially, PLAs were instituted at airport expansion projects, and over the following 
ten years they spread to county and municipal office buildings, mass transit, 
schools, and new private development. Alongside the PLAs, the building trades 
supported several programs (mentorship, housing, transportation, preappren­
ticeship, and so on) to help apprentices both on and off the job, using contribu­
tions from the port, which also had an interest in spreading the proceeds of 
development. Despite some disagreements with the building trades over the ad­
ministration of the programs, the port reported that significant improvements
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had been made in gender and racial diversity. The building trades and KCLC also 
managed to include other social goods, such as organizing rights and affordable 
housing, into some of the more controversial projects. By the late 1990s, Scott’s 
group, the Northwest Labor and Employment Law Office (LELO), was helping to 
frame project labor agreements and taking an active role in monitoring their im­
plementation.
The spread of PLAs— or more precisely, the apprenticeship rules in them— 
was a victory for the unions. Other local actors began taking unions seriously as 
advocates for socially responsible growth. The stabilizing effect came partly from 
rules stipulating that apprentices had to enroll in state-licensed apprenticeship 
programs. Unionized programs cover 95 percent of King County’s apprentices. 
Furthermore, according to union leaders, they overcame some employer resis­
tance to unionization when contractors saw that unions were flexible with their 
rules and could supply a high-quality workforce. The new rules eased the transi­
tion of nonunion workers into the unionized workforce, in that nonunion work­
ers under the PLA now worked alongside union members and changed hiring 
rules made it easier for skilled nonunion workers to enter the union with their 
journeyman skills recognized. Working with business did not force a consistent 
progrowth position: the building trades helped environmentalists in the late 
1990s to defeat a ballot initiative to overturn the state’s growth management law 
(Rose 2000).
As the unions were healing the wounds of the past, they were creating a basis 
for restoring the market share of their employers and removing barriers to orga­
nizing. These local innovations laid the groundwork for national policy develop­
ment. These rules inserted in PLAs have been widely disseminated, partly because 
the Seattle case has been publicized as a best practice by the national AFL-CIO 
(Working for America Institute 2002) and partly because of a shift within na­
tional construction unions toward an aggressive organizing program. Further­
more, there have been local spillovers. Seattle’s building-trades unions are now 
trying to win apprenticeship rules without the concessions associated with PLAs. 
In 2005, legislation passed in the state legislature extending a 15 percent appren­
tice utilization requirement to public works projects statewide.
Economic development politics, however, have also had a downside for Seat­
tle’s unions. The region’s largest employer, Boeing, has forced unions into some 
extremely difficult political positions. Boeing employs over fifty thousand work­
ers in design and production facilities, mainly in southern King County and 
Everett. The company has long dominated local labor markets for skilled blue and 
white-collar aerospace workers and has found ways to win union support for 
subsidies and infrastructure investment from state and local governments. Since
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Boeing became the dominant local employer during World War II, its patterns of 
hiring and firing have created periods of boom and bust (Markusen, Golob, and 
Grey 1996). In recent years, Boeing has become increasingly footloose. It has 
shifted its headquarters from Seattle to Chicago (where it has no production fa­
cilities) and outsourced and offshored considerable production (including some 
complex work such as wing production). The company’s labor-relations strategy 
has come to emphasize union busting and downsizing— “reduce union leverage; 
reduce union workers”3— and it has met several organizing drives with union- 
busting tactics. Most important for Seattle’s unions, however, was the company’s 
threat to shift assembly work of a new plane, the 7E7, to a greenfield location.
Boeing’s workers belong to two unions that have few members outside the 
company: the blue-collar International Association of Machinists District Lodge 
751 and the white-collar Seattle Professional Engineering Employees’Association 
(SPEEA). Both organizations have considerable autonomy from their national 
organizations; SPEEA affiliated to a small national union in 1998 in which it is 
the largest affiliate. The national and transnational links between Boeing unions 
are extremely loose, occurring via the Coalition of Labor Unions at Boeing or the 
International Metalworkers Federation (which also brings together representa­
tives from Airbus and elsewhere). The near absence of union organization in lo­
cal manufacturing outside Boeing results in large wage discrepancies between 
unionized Boeing workers and the rest of the industry. These unions and their 
members are thus highly dependent on demand for aircraft and the company’s 
decisions about how to meet that demand.
During the 1990s, the IAM and SPEEA fit Seattle labor’s revitalization image. 
During Boeing’s boom period, the unions organized successful strikes and made 
gains in participation rights. The 1995 IAM strike and the 2000 SPEEA strike 
both involved intensive cooperation with KCLC, Jobs with Justice, and with other 
unions and community groups. In the case of SPEEA’s “No Nerds, No Birds” 
strike, the union won massive increases in membership in a workplace without 
mandatory membership. This and a major organizing drive in Boeing’s Wichita 
plant (contested by management even after the initial certification election) al­
lowed SPEEA to double its membership in the four years leading up to Boeing’s 
crisis. These struggles provided an opportunity for unions and other community 
groups to mobilize and show solidarity.
When the market for commercial jets collapsed after the September 11 attacks 
and the Asian SARS outbreaks, the fight for jobs took center stage. The unions’ 
approach has been twofold: outside the workplace they have entered coalitions
3. Dominic Gates, “A Critical Juncture for Boeing and Machinists,” Seattle Times, June 14, 2004, A l.
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with managers, Boeing lobbyists, and other partners to improve Boeing’s busi­
ness climate (winning subsidies, government orders, infrastructure, and other ad­
vantages); inside the workplace, they have used a partnership approach to win 
participation rights in work reorganization and outsourcing decisions, in hopes 
of preventing mismanagement and saving jobs. Union leaders have been largely 
dissatisfied with the results of in-firm partnership, due to management’s ten­
dency to ignore the advice of joint committees and distance joint activities from 
the core of strategic decision making. The IAM’s training fund, for example, has 
been used more as a way to help unemployed workers get skills for other jobs than 
for its stated purpose, to improve quality at Boeing.
In late 2002, however, a flurry of job retention activities began outside the 
workplace. Boeing announced that it was building a new plane, the 7E7 Dream­
liner. In order to choose a site for the new assembly plant, the firm solicited bids 
from state governments throughout the United States, in a competition that was 
to last a year. The governor, county executives, and mayors gathered in public dis­
plays of support for Boeing and commitment to meet the company’s demands. 
IAM and SPEEA mobilized to win support for subsidies, infrastructure invest­
ments, and other reforms to benefit the company. IAM was especially active, or­
ganizing a volunteer effort of eight hundred shop stewards to put up yard signs, 
lobby, and carry out discussions with local residents and business people about 
the importance of supporting Boeing.
For its part, Boeing made common cause with a coalition of business groups 
with whom it had disagreed over past unemployment insurance reforms. The 
head of Boeing’s commercial aircraft unit, Alan Mullaly, gave business leaders 
their rallying cry at a Rotary Club meeting in late 2003. When asked his opinion 
about local business conditions, he said, “I think we suck.” Business groups in the 
state capital successfully used the ensuing support for Boeing-friendly legislation 
as an opportunity to win reforms o f the unemployment insurance system, not 
only to help Boeing’s bottom line but also to help building contractors and 
farmers. The proposal that passed eliminated benefits for thousands of seasonal 
workers, including construction workers, who use the unemployment system to 
survive periodic unavoidable periods of unemployment. More important for the 
IAM and SPEEA, Boeing won $3.2 billion in tax breaks.
Once the legislature passed the incentive package, Boeing agreed to build the 
new assembly plant in Everett. The building-trades unions sent angry letters to 
IAM leaders for accepting the unemployment insurance cuts, and the tax created 
difficulties for anyone advocating state government investment elsewhere. How­
ever, IAM and SPEEA’s message of jobs above all else was understandable, since 
it came at the end of a wave of downsizing that had cost the region thirty thou­
sand jobs. The gains were relatively small: the company projected two thousand
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new local Boeing jobs, plus an unknown number in local suppliers. The business 
press urged the public to view the subsidy package not in terms of the two thou­
sand jobs but in terms of retaining the remaining fifty thousand jobs.4
At Boeing and the building trades, local unions responded to challenges from 
the global economy in different ways. At Boeing, a high-stakes race for investment 
forced the unions into a position where they had to participate in a coalition to 
win subsidies and other advantages to retain jobs. The legislative battle tem­
porarily divided the states labor movement and gutted the state’s protections for 
seasonal workers. This decision had little positive effect on union membership, 
since the company’s new assembly plant had few employees compared to the 
number recently lost. Furthermore, the unions did not represent employees at 
the company’s major local or offshore suppliers, which would employ most of the 
workers on the 7E7 project. At the building trades, by contrast, the unions had to 
innovate in the policy arena to hold their own against nonunion contractors 
vying for contracts in a building boom. With the assistance of the KCLC and sev­
eral quasi-public agencies, the building trades strategically built bridges to long­
time adversaries in the community, diversified union membership to reflect the 
new construction workforce, and laid the foundations for new kinds of social reg­
ulation of private development. While Boeing’s unions were coerced by crisis into 
working to help the company obtain public funds, the building trades responded 
to their crisis through innovative policies inserted in PLAs and successfully held 
the line on low-wage competition.
Both of these stories are rooted in the growth politics of Seattle and have im­
plications for the local labor movement as a whole. Although union victories at 
Boeing before the downturn were part of the story of the revival of the local la­
bor movement, mobilizations to win Boeing investment have threatened not only 
unions but also public finances and public programs. Likewise, the building- 
trades’ initiatives have affected not only construction workers but also have been 
an integral part of the careers of bridge builders like Judd and Scott. The impact 
of coalition building in Seattle has arguably been global, in that the KCLC and 
LELO both played crucial roles in the 1999 WTO protests. Patterns of union-em­
ployer dependence and different opportunities in (and pressures from) the local 
business community, government, and civil society have thus shaped what is pos­
sible for unions in Seattle.
4. Glenn Pascall, “Take the State’s 7E7 Deal, but Forget the Study,” Puget Sound Business Journal, July 
7,2004: http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2004/07/05/editopial3.html?page=2.
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URBAN POLlflCAL ECONOMY AND LABOR’S 
SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES
Unions are searching for alternatives, and, despite their dark side, the politics of 
local economic development holds some promise for this search. While some 
unions revive themselves through coalition politics to pursue broad social goods, 
others end up on an economistic low road. Why do unions pursue these differ­
ent goods? The observed differences reflect not only differences in union strategy 
but also in what is possible for policymakers, what Savitch and Kantor (2002) call 
differences in the menu of policy choices.
I take seriously the argument made By"unionists at Boeing and Airbus in in­
terviews that they understood the trade-offs, but had no choice. While the possi­
bility of capital flight created a threat, the interests and mobilization of local 
business and local government provided an opportunity. Building trades and 
health-care unionists, by contrast, said in interviews that they had developed 
something new and built bridges that had helped them both save jobs and win 
credibility in local policymaking that provides broad social goods.
Do inadequate industrial relations institutions in the United States spur inno­
vative union strategies by forcing a search for alternative sources of power? Do 
the German institutions of workplace participation and sectoral wage bargaining 
continue to support participation and union strength? Neither institutional hy­
pothesis seems helpful in this comparison. Progressive union-inclusive coalition 
building was visible in both cities, as was a more coercive pattern of participation. 
Despite national differences, union leaders such as Judd and Rose were able to in­
novate. Moreover, unions in both countries, regardless of formal information and 
consultation rights, faced uncertainty and dependence. The announcement of a 
race for a new production line gave unions in Seattle and Hamburg a threat and 
opportunity that forced them into a development coalition with narrowly econ­
omistic aims.
A second factor, the economic structure and power relations of the sector, 
provides more analytical leverage. Airbus and Boeing are multinational firms, 
competing with each other in the global airplane market, while LBK and the 
unionized construction sector in Seattle compete in less export-oriented indus­
tries. Furthermore, Airbus and Boeing can invest in a much wider range of loca­
tions than LBK or Seattle’s building contractors (although the vast sunk costs and 
reserves of skilled labor make aircraft makers more locally dependent than most 
manufacturers).
A sectoral explanation stressing the differences between multinational manu­
facturing and local services leaves a few features of this comparison unexplained. 
It remains to be explained, for example, why unionists did not utilize the large
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firm structure as an opportunity, especially the Germany-wide and European 
works councils. Furthermore, all three sectors are both localized and globalized. 
While LBK and Seattle’s real estate development industries also depend on su­
perregional markets for capital, Boeing and Airbus face some local regulation via 
the influence of local politicians in national policymaking. Industrial, trade, and 
land-use policies still constrain these aerospace giants, despite their political 
power and control over the location of jobs. In addition, a focus on sectoral dif­
ferences neglects changes over time in cities and firms. With a change in local pol­
itics, Hamburg’s unions took a different approach at both Airbus and LBK, and 
a change in Boeing’s fortunes led to a change at IAM and SPEEA.
What are the salient differences between sectors in these places? First, the 
pattern of union-employer dependence shapes the menu of possible policies. 
Workers and unions at Boeing and Airbus are highly dependent on a single 
transnational firm, because finding a job as an aerospace mechanic or engineer 
in the adjacent region at the same pay level is difficult, and because the unions 
have limited presence outside of these employers. Their counterparts in he^th 
care and construction, by contrast, organize broadly across industries, and there­
fore have much less of an existential fear of job losses. These unions lack the in­
tense pressure seen at Airbus and Boeing to sacrifice the environment, public 
funds, and welfare benefits in exchange for jobs.
Second, mobilizations of actors outside of the labor-management relationship 
have set up opportunities for unions (although in the high-stakes races for in­
vestment seen at Airbus and Boeing, the opportunities have come with clear 
disadvantages). When jobs are threatened by an interregional competition for in­
vestment, local politicians and business representatives gave worker representa­
tives an additional set of resources to fight for jobs. Health-care and construction 
organizers, similarly, deal with competition with the help of community allies. 
The difference is the quality of the partners and their interests. Oppositional po­
litical parties, community organizations, and other partners, with their wider 
range of interests, can help unions reach beyond the goal of job retention.
These patterns of union-firm dependence and broader mobilizations of busi­
ness, government, and civil society explain the menu of options that are available 
for local political participation in economic development policy, in Seattle, Ham­
burg, and possibly beyond. Whether a union seizes opportunities, however, is a 
matter of strategic choice and cannot be read from the political-economic factors 
highlighted here. Political economy cannot tell us whether other leaders in the 
same circumstances would have made the same decisions as Rose or Judd.
Union-inclusive coalition building can emerge in cities that vary by size, eco­
nomic well-being, labor history, culture, and country. These coalitions, however 
progressive, do not usually reverse trends of declining union density, certainly not
2 1 0 IAN GREER
in Hamburg and Seattle. Union membership decline thus may be robbing cities 
of one of the most important supports of high-road economic development. On 
the other hand, threats to jobs and opportunities to participate might be turning 
unions into better local citizens.
Current economic development trends are simultaneously transforming and 
decimating unions. Will they be able to do more with less through smarter par­
ticipation? Only time will tell.
